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Background: In 2004, Gabbay and le May showed that clinicians generally base their decisions on mindlines—
internalised and collectively reinforced tacit guidelines—rather than consulting written clinical guidelines. We
considered how the concept of mindlines has been taken forward since.
Methods: We searched databases from 2004 to 2014 for the term ‘mindline(s)’ and tracked all sources citing Gabbay
and le May’s 2004 article. We read and re-read papers to gain familiarity and developed an interpretive analysis
and taxonomy by drawing on the principles of meta-narrative systematic review.
Results: In our synthesis of 340 papers, distinguished between authors who used mindlines purely in name
(‘nominal’ view) sometimes dismissing them as a harmful phenomenon, and authors who appeared to have
understood the term’s philosophical foundations. The latter took an ‘in-practice’ view (studying how mindlines
emerge and spread in real-world settings), a ‘theoretical and philosophical’ view (extending theory) or a ‘solution
focused’ view (exploring how to promote and support mindline development). We found that it is not just clinicians
who develop mindlines: so do patients, in face-to-face and (potentially) online communities.
Theoretical publications on mindlines have continued to challenge the rationalist assumptions of evidence-based
medicine (EBM). Conventional EBM assumes a single, knowable reality and seeks to strip away context to generate
universal predictive rules. In contrast, mindlines are predicated on a more fluid, embodied and intersubjective view of
knowledge; they accommodate context and acknowledge multiple realities. When considering how knowledge
spreads, the concept of mindlines requires us to go beyond the constraining notions of ‘dissemination’ and ‘translation’
to study tacit knowledge and the interactive human processes by which such knowledge is created, enacted and
shared. Solution-focused publications described mindline-promoting initiatives such as relationship-building, collaborative
learning and thought leadership.
Conclusions: The concept of mindlines challenges the naïve rationalist view of knowledge implicit in some EBM
publications, but the term appears to have been misunderstood (and prematurely dismissed) by some authors. By further
studying mindlines empirically and theoretically, there is potential to expand EBM’s conceptual toolkit to produce richer
forms of ‘evidence-based’ knowledge. We outline a suggested research agenda for achieving this goal.
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Ten years ago, Gabbay and le May published a prominent
article in the British Medical Journal in which they chal-
lenged the ‘over-rationalist model implicit in evidence
based health care’ [1,2]. In an ethnographic study in UK
general practice, they showed that clinicians only rarely
accessed research findings, clinical guidelines and other
types of formal knowledge directly. Rather, they preferred
to rely on what they called ‘mindlines’, defined as ‘collect-
ively reinforced, internalised tacit guidelines, which were in-
formed by brief reading, but mainly by their interactions
with each other and with opinion leaders, patients, and
pharmaceutical representatives and by other sources of
largely tacit knowledge that built on their early training and
their own and their colleagues’ experience’ [1].
Much subsequent research in mainstream health services
research pursued and confirmed the negative finding of this
study—that doctors rarely consult written guidelines when
making clinical decisions. Studies sought to identify ‘bar-
riers’ to guideline implementation on the assumption that
more assiduous following of guidelines by individuals
would lead to more evidence-based care—see for example
[3-5]. A somewhat smaller literature (reviewed below)
aligned with Gabbay and le May’s positive finding—that
doctors follow mindlines—and sought to characterise, ex-
plore and occasionally critique the concept of collectively
embodied tacit knowledge and how it links to the goal of
evidence-based practice.
The early evidence-based medicine movement (more
commonly known as EBM, but also referred to as
evidence-based healthcare or practice) explicitly set out
to ‘de-emphasise intuition, unsystematic clinical experi-
ence, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient ground
for clinical decision making’, whilst stressing the instru-
mental role of evidence from research (especially the
‘gold standard’ design, the randomised controlled trial)
in clinical decision-making [6]. Although Sackett et al.
later softened this stance by writing that ‘evidence based
medicine is not restricted to randomised trials and
meta-analyses’ and should be seen as ‘the best external
evidence with which to answer our clinical questions’ [7],
at a philosophical level, EBM seems to rest on a Cartesian
view of knowledge as ‘facts’ that are stored in the heads of
individual practitioners and/or in formal knowledge re-
positories, separate from the physical body, independently
verifiable and distinct from values. Notwithstanding recent
calls by the ‘real EBM’ campaign for a broadening of the
parameters of EBM [8], such a conceptualisation would
see mindlines (at best) as a lesser form of knowledge and
(at worst) as not really existing.
In this paper, we want to discuss whether and how
mindlines have influenced, or should influence, the EBM
movement. To explore the impact of mindlines on EBM,
we sought to document how the concept of mindlineswas picked up and applied by researchers and practi-
tioners following Gabbay and le May’s seminal paper.
We also sought to further advance how mindlines have
challenged EBM by drawing together findings from these
papers as well as revisiting Gabbay and le May’s detailed
explanation of mindlines in their 2011 book and bring-
ing in relevant literature from a wider range of disciplin-
ary traditions, including philosophy of science. In this
review, we argue that to study mindlines to their full po-
tential, we need to break out of the constraining notions
of ‘dissemination’ and ‘translation’ (both of which imply
a Cartesian view of knowledge) and focus more on the
embodied nature of tacit knowledge and the interactive
processes of knowledge creation.
Methods
We started by searching for any article with a reference
to the word mindline or mindlines using the search
query mindline* in the PubMed, Web of Science and
OvidSP reference search engines. In PubMed, we se-
lected all NCBI databases up to 2014 and in Ovid the
Embase, 1996 to 2014 Week 50, HMIC Health Manage-
ment Information Consortium 1979 to November 2014,
Journals@Ovid Full Text December 16, 2014 and Book-
s@Ovid December 11, 2014 databases. We then searched
and included articles that cited Gabbay and le May’s 2004
paper on Web of Science and screened Google scholar
and books for any further relevant references. We merged
the results and excluded hits in which the term ‘Mindline’
was an author’s name.
Data analysis
We undertook an interpretive synthesis of this literature,
drawing on the principles of meta-narrative review
[9,10]. This approach was selected because it is designed
to capture different underlying assumptions about, and
approaches to, a concept. In an initial familiarisation
phase, we independently read the articles repeatedly and
highlighted sections where the term ‘mindline(s)’ was
used. We then collaboratively sorted the articles into para-
digmatic groups (i.e. by the philosophical assumptions,
theoretical models and methodological approaches shared
by different groups of authors). In a subsequent synthesis
phase, we compared and contrasted these different para-
digmatic perspectives using narrative methods.
In explaining our findings, we adapted a taxonomy ori-
ginally developed by Orlikowski and Iacono [11] to classify
the different ways in which the term ‘IT [information tech-
nology]’ was used in papers describing ‘IT research’. The
reason for this was that the notion of the ‘nominal’ view
from this taxonomy applied very well to many papers in
our sample (i.e. papers in which mindlines were mentioned
by name but never defined or explored). To this, we added
an ‘in practice’ view (i.e. observational studies of how
Wieringa and Greenhalgh Implementation Science  (2015) 10:45 Page 3 of 11mindlines are enacted in real-world clinical practice), a
‘theoretical and philosophical’ view (in which mindlines
were included in a wider theory of knowledge sharing
and/or collaborative practice or articles discussing the
ontological and/or epistemological assumptions of the
concept of mindlines), and a ‘solution’ view (i.e. pro-
posals for how the development of evidence-based
mindlines might be promoted and supported). Import-
antly, many articles could be incorporated into several
of these views and these framings are not intended to
be mutually exclusive or fixed beyond debate.
Results
Searching for mindline(s), we found one book, 139
articles in PubMed Central (PMC), 11 articles in
PubMed, 14 results in Web of Science and 69 results
in Ovid. When merged, 196 results remained. We
found 213 results citing Gabbay and le May’s paper
and another 24 publications by screening Google
scholar and books. After merging these results, re-
moval of duplicates and excluding 12 articles by or re-
ferring to authors named Mindline, 340 references
remained. The complete reference list is in Additional
file 1.
There were no publications before 2004 in the
remaining dataset; Gabbay and le May appear to be the
first researchers to use the word ‘mindline’ [1]. They
subsequently elaborated on the concept in a book [12].
Although the paradigm-shifting potential of the min-
xsgrdlines concept was the subject of an early BMJ edi-
torial [2], uptake of the term by the wider academic
community was slow. A study from 2006 was unable to
detect ‘mindline’ as a term in a large sample of articles
from 12 major medical journals [13]. Most papers re-
ferred to Gabbay and le May’s work on mindlines in an
implicit way (for example, in 195 publications, we were
able to confirm that the term ‘mindline(s)’ was not used
at all).
Literature on mindlines that appeared after Gabbay
and le May’s article could broadly be categorised into
four groups representing different (but overlapping)
paradigmatic perspectives. First, there was the ‘nominal’
framing, in which authors referred (implicitly or expli-
citly) to mindlines but did not further explain or expand.
We found 133 papers that would primarily fit this view.
For instance, mindlines are mentioned in this paper as
an unelaborated example of sub-optimal practice when
the president of the Australian Patient Safety Foundation
is quoted:
‘There’s a tendency to criticize evidence in order to
maintain the status quo, […] medical practice is
currently dictated by traditional approaches and
“collective mindlines”.’ [14].In seven papers, comments appeared to come from
the guideline development community, and most of
them best fitted the nominal view. For example, a paper
whose first author’s affiliation is the Italian Cochrane
centre, mindlines are referred to as ‘anachronistic’ [15].
Another paper from the Canadian Thoracic Society (er-
roneously in our view) conflates mindlines with the
rapid exchange of ‘easily understood’ information among
practitioners:
‘The literature suggests that health care providers
seldom consult guidelines in practice; instead, they
rapidly glean pieces of information from documents or
colleagues with whom they construct “mindlines” that
inform clinical decisions. To emulate this practical
knowledge exchange medium, guidelines should
include information that can be easily understood and
transmitted’ [16].
We believe this recommendation reflects a naïve con-
ceptualisation of the ontology of knowledge (seen as
facts to be transmitted, simple ones being more trans-
missible than complicated ones). As we argue below, to
understand mindlines requires that we go beyond such a
conceptualisation.
The second framing of mindlines, we gleaned from the
literature was the ‘in practice’ view, in which the term
was used to explain the empirical finding that clinicians
are rarely observed to follow written guidelines (but
appear to follow mindlines instead). We found 76 papers
that primarily referred to mindlines from this point of
view. In these papers, the term ‘mindlines’ often seemed
to mean ‘consulting colleagues’. For example, one study
showed that, like GPs, general surgeons most often
turned to colleagues before using other sources of know-
ledge such as the internet, educational meetings or the
library [17].
In a few studies, the ‘in practice’ view of mindlines
closely reflected Gabbay and le May’s original theorisa-
tion. In a study on the role of tacit knowledge in how
public healthcare groups planned initiatives, for example,
the authors found that ‘study participants used collect-
ively reinforced tacit guidelines based on experiences and
interactions in fluid communities of practice rather than
drawing on research findings or explicit practice guide-
lines’ [18]. In a study on the influences on prescribing in
general practice, Grant et al. found that practitioners
used ‘prescribing mindlines’. ‘These were personal formu-
laries developed from and informed by their experience
of medication (including patient’s experiences), specialist
advice, discussions with their practice pharmacist and
GP colleagues, and the practice’s macro prescribing policy
(if present). GPs rarely looked up information about med-
icines and relied on these prescribing mindlines. […] GPs
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date their mindlines’ [19].
In a cross-national study on what physicians gain and
lose with clinical experience with diabetes, Elstad et al.
write ‘In tune with Gabbay & le May’s “mindlines” […], we
found that physicians gained their experience in part
through their professional interactions’. They then quote
an experienced German clinician who comments on com-
paring intuitive concerns: ‘Happily we are two physicians
working here… I say, “It’s funny, something is wrong with
him”. And my colleague says, “You know, you are right.
Something is wrong. He simulated, or lied or something is
rotten”. We nearly always agree. You can’t have that in an
office where you work alone, but it’s really good. We swap
ideas on the patients’ [20].
Gabbay’s and le May’s ethnographic methodology is repli-
cated in one of the few studies in the literature to tease out
what the key mindlines were in a particular topic area [21].
In this qualitative study, the authors invoke three ‘mind-
lines’ of clinicians which appear to explain why malaria is
overdiagnosed in Tanzania. In this example, however, one
could claim that mindlines are merely depicted as un-
spoken rules of thumb or maxims that generally override
more specific and detailed formal recommendations:
‘Rather than following national guidelines for the
diagnosis of febrile illness, clinician behaviour
appeared to follow “mindlines”: shared rationales
constructed from these different spheres of influence.
Three mindlines were identified in this setting:
malaria is easier to diagnose than alternative diseases;
malaria is a more acceptable diagnosis; and missing
malaria is indefensible. These mindlines were
apparent during the training stages as well as
throughout clinical careers.’ [21]
Chandler et al.’s study is cited in 33 papers in our sam-
ple, but most of these do not actually refer to the concept
of mindlines (they cite the paper to support the statement
that there is overdiagnosis of malaria).
Third, mindlines were sometimes framed as a theoret-
ical or philosophical concept in publications (with or
without an empirical component) whose main purpose
appeared to be the development of theory. We classified
57 papers as predominantly this framing.
Many theoretical papers discussed mindlines in the
light of Lave and Wenger’s theory of communities of
practice. For instance, Li et al. combine the concept of
mindlines with communities of practice and Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s knowledge creation cycle (which considers
how formal codified knowledge is made tacit and dis-
seminated among organisational members through ob-
servation and discussion, thereby becoming meaningful
and applicable in practice) [22]. They state:‘Explicit knowledge is codified information such as
peer-reviewed articles, rules, and guidelines, which can
be readily shared among people. However, to apply this
knowledge in practice, practitioners must make sense
of the concrete information in the context in which it
is used. This process of establishing meaning can be
facilitated by discussions with colleagues and mentors
or by observing how others apply the knowledge and
then try it themselves. ’ [22]
Similarly, Crites et al. talk about the knowledge cre-
ation cycle and link this to the literature on learning or-
ganisations as described by Argyris and Schon [23]; they
take from mindlines that external knowledge needs to be
‘validated through informal team discourse and modified
for practical application’ by working teams [24].
Ranmuthugala includes Gabbay and le May’s ethnog-
raphy in an elaborate systematic literature review on
why and how communities of practice are established in
healthcare [25]. Soubhi et al. offer a theorisation of the
communities of practice literature, enhanced by the no-
tion of mindlines, as it might be applied to multi-
disciplinary care for complex multi-morbidity [26].
Several studies see mindlines as empirical support for
the tenets of social network theory primarily by taking the
notion from Gabbay and le May’s work that clinicians rely
on their peers to acquire knowledge. They set out to ex-
plore what personal relationships between clinicians exist
—for example, to study the propensity towards EBM of
physicians in relation to their ‘coreness’ (that is, closeness
to the centre) in their social network [27], to explore how
the structure of patient-sharing relationships among phy-
sicians [28] is related to care patterns of high or low costs
within hospitals [29] and what factors affect the influence
of certain physicians in a network on the thinking and
practice of other physicians [30]. An alternative argument
is that the concept of social networks neither confirms nor
refutes the kinds of knowledge exchange that are implicit
in the concept of mindlines.
Other studies link mindlines to social influence. Lomas,
for example, provides a useful overview of the literature
on the cultural gap between research and policymaking—
and the essentially social (not technical) nature of success-
ful efforts to bridge this gap [31]. He uses the concept of
mindlines to underline the social nature of collective influ-
ence in both the research and policymaking communities.
Nine publications in our sample explicitly criticised the
political, economic and ethical dimensions of how re-
search knowledge is generated (for example the tainting of
research funding through industry conflicts of interest).
However, they usually did not link these critiques to mind-
lines directly.
In an article on clinical decision-making in Ghana, the
authors used a novel theoretical framework of guidelines
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The last are a patient version of mindlines, consisting of
‘client influences related to the preferences and pressures
of the client and the wider family and community, including
social, religious and cultural values and beliefs’ [32].
Papers that addressed the ontology (what is it) and
epistemiology (how might we study it) of knowledge
considered topics such as the difference between explicit
and tacit knowledge, the nature of clinical reasoning and
the validity and transferability of medical knowledge. For
example, several authors referred to mindlines as a form
of system 1 (intuitive) as opposed to system 2 (analytical)
thinking in articles on clinical information processing and
cognitive errors [33-35]. Bate et al. explain:
‘Dual process theory states that humans process
information in two ways, termed System 1 and System
2. System 1 processing is an “intuitive, automatic, fast,
frugal and effortless” process, involving the
construction of mental maps and patterns, shortcuts
and rules of thumb (heuristics), and “mindlines”
(collectively reinforced, internalized tacit guidelines).
These are developed through experience and
repetition, usually based on undergraduate teaching,
brief written summaries, seeing what other people do,
talking to local colleagues and personal experience.
System 2 processing involves a careful, rational
analysis and evaluation of the available information.
This is effortful and time consuming. Data from a
variety of environments demonstrates that human
beings prefer to use System 1 processing whenever
possible. ’ [35]
In a number of papers, however, this deeper under-
standing of mindlines was missing, and authors simply
equated mindlines to heuristics.
Walach et al. propose a ‘circular’ model for linking evi-
dence and clinical decision-making [36,37]. Like Henry
et al. [38], they reject the hierarchy of evidence (rando-
mised trials at the top, ‘anecdotes’ at the bottom) as valid
only in relation to simple decisions about the efficacy of
drug therapies. Most clinical decisions, they argue, are
complex; they involve ethical and human decisions as
well as scientific ones and, hence, require the integration
of multiple considerations and forms of evidence. The
tacit knowledge of mindlines may be more appropriate
for the complex and organic nature of real-world medi-
cine than the ‘if…then’ structure of guidelines and deci-
sion support tools.
In a systematic review of knowledge exchange mecha-
nisms, Contandriopoulos and colleagues consider know-
ledge in two essential forms: individual, that is, held in
people’s heads and translated (or not) into action by hu-
man will and agency and collective, that is, socially sharedand organizationally embedded—a form akin to Gabbay
and le May’s mindlines [39].
A final framing of the ‘mindlines’ concept, sometimes
offered as a conclusion in an empirical or theoretical
paper, was solution-focused: some authors considered
the question of how to actively promote and support the
development of valid embodied/collective knowledge or
‘evidence-based mindlines’. In 28 sources, this seemed
the main purpose of the article. For example, the chal-
lenge was expressed (somewhat obliquely) in a letter by
Glasziou, in which he recognises the concept of mind-
lines in clinical practice, but is worried that they could
‘supply counterfeit evidence. […] a puzzle remains: how
do we get valid memes into the mindlines while not driving
out the wisdom of experience?’ [40].
Two studies describe efforts to set up (and influence
the behaviour of ) communities of practice among re-
searchers [41] and doctors [42] by employing a facilitator
and co-ordinator respectively, though each of these studies
mentions mindlines only in passing. In a more theoretically
informed paper, Soubhi et al.’s model of communities of
practice in multi-morbidity care is also solution-focused,
emphasising relationship-building and collaborative learn-
ing as the basis for developing mindlines. They hope that
qualitative and quantitative research could ‘examine how
primary care physicians develop mindlines and how they
test them to eliminate harmful ones and standardize others
into routine practice’.
Others call for knowledge brokers [31], transform-
ational leaders [43], thought leaders [44] and individuals
more generally [41] to alter, expand and embed new
knowledge through social influence within (and indeed
extending beyond) existing communities of practice.
These proposals echo and flesh out Gabbay and le May’s
original exhortation to make sure that the knowledge
circulating within communities is based on sound research
[1]. In their systematic review, Contandriopoulos et al. sug-
gest that knowledge may become collectivised through a
variety of mechanisms, including efforts to make it relevant
(timely, salient, actionable), legitimate (credible, authorita-
tive, reasonable), and accessible (available, understandable,
assimilable) and to take account of the assumptions and
priorities of a particular audience [34].
Reeve et al. draw parallels between mindlines and
the (subtle and often overlooked) skills of expert gen-
eralism in GP practice [45]. These authors offer a
four-phase approach to developing generalist expert-
ise: sense-making (popularising the concept of gener-
alist expertise and raising awareness of it across a
community of practitioners), engagement (influencing
practitioners to prioritise this issue), action (e.g. deliv-
ering education, promoting scholarship as part of pro-
fessional practice) and monitoring (measuring the
impact of this approach).
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GP consultations were, Zwolsman et al. observed that GPs
were often unable to account for the source of their know-
ledge (personal experience or research evidence) and that
rapid, intuitive decisions, suggesting a predominantly tacit
form of knowledge, were the norm [46]. The authors felt
that making all steps in the decision-making chain more
explicit (for example, justifying the chain of reasoning to
the patient) would surface gaps in knowledge, inform fur-
ther learning and—in the long run—make practice more
evidence based.
In contrast, Levine et al. suggest the opposite. They
propose making guidelines more implicit by transforming
them in to aphorisms which they define as ‘succinct sayings
that offer advice’. These should function as ‘interface be-
tween intuitive approaches to make rapid decisions, and the
implementation of specialty-specific clinical guidelines’ [47].
Discussion
This systematic narrative review has revealed a relatively
sparse literature on the important concept of mindlines,
first introduced in 2004 by Gabbay and le May. Whilst
we included 340 publications in our final dataset, some
authors appeared to have (with the best of intentions)
used this term incorrectly and naively. But others had
recognised and explored mindlines’ fundamental philo-
sophical challenge to EBM. The relatively limited contri-
butions from the guideline development community
suggest that the concept has been largely ignored by the
guideline industry—perhaps because, as American physi-
cist and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn wrote, ‘the
proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades
in different worlds’ [48].
‘Knowledge translation’, one-way transfer of knowledge
from producer (research) to user (clinician) [49,50], remains
a (contested) policy challenge. Multiple research traditions
have contributed to a vast body of literature on how evi-
dence from research is disseminated [51,52]. Underlying
this literature is a fundamental hope for the possibility of
optimising the ‘intermediation’ of knowledge—that is, the
managed processes by which practitioners can be sup-
ported to interact with knowledge [53]. But an alternative
metaphor that goes beyond the concept of ‘spreading’ good
ideas is needed [54].
In their book from 2011, Gabbay and le May explain in
great detail the origins of mindlines, their implications and
related theories [12]. Mindlines fit a view that knowledge is
not so much a set of external facts that are waiting to be
‘translated’ or ‘disseminated’ but a more fluid and multi-
directional phenomenon in which knowledge is ‘re-created’
in different contexts by different people again and again as
previously postulated by Mol and Nonaka [55,56]. From
this perspective, improving knowledge intermediation is
more like maximising the opportunity to create knowledge.How this might be achieved differs from the EBM para-
digm in a number of ways uncovered by Gabbay and le
May throughout their book. We explore these philosophical
questions further below.
Reality—single or multiple?
Firstly, mindlines question our assumptions about reality.
Without doing full justice to the vast literature and on-
going debate on the philosophy of knowledge, we acknow-
ledge in particular the philosophical difference between
naïve realism (in which there is one reality, which exists
independently of human thought and can ultimately be
known by everyone) and more pluralist philosophies (such
as subjective idealism and critical realism) which assume
multiple realities, none of which are fully shared [57].
The possibility of multiple realities explains why differ-
ent national guidelines for even simple conditions like
urinary tract infections draw different conclusions from
the latest research [58]. Naïve rationalists (some protag-
onists of EBM, for example) think that we will overcome
these differences and ultimately have a clear set of ‘facts’,
recommendations, international clinical guidelines and
policies that everyone except the misguided and ignorant
will all agree upon. In contrast, as Gabbay and le May
point out [12], the concept of mindlines presents us with
the idea of a shared (but by no means homogeneous)
reality consisting of multiple very individual and temporary
realities of people: clinicians, researchers, guideline makers
and patients. Mindlines offer a view that the number of
guidelines on any topic will never cease to expand because
we expect new individual realities and scientific paradigms
to emerge continuously.
The nature of knowledge
Absent in the conventional EBM paradigm, but very
present in the concept of mindlines, is the acknowledge-
ment that, to use Polanyi’s phrase, ‘we know more than we
can tell’—that is, not all knowledge is conscious or explicit
[59]. Gabbay and le May discuss how mindlines include
‘knowledge-in-practice-in-context’: practical knowledge
formed not only by the setting but also by the need for
that knowledge [12]. Conventional EBM views knowledge
narrowly as factual data, only a tiny fraction of which are
relevant to the decision at hand (and that it will be largely
self-evident which ‘facts’ are needed). The mindlines con-
cept envisions a ‘negotiating space’ [12] where clinical
decision-making by clinicians and patients involves a
process of reduction and prioritisation from a vast realm
of potentially relevant knowledge of different kinds.
In this sense, we would argue that mindlines stress both
the act of and the need for reducing possible options for
action. EBM does not reject the idea of reducing know-
ledge—for example, the guideline development process
encourages the dismissal of evidence and knowledge that
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process of reduction applies not only to explicit know-
ledge. All kinds of knowledge are competing for attention
[12,39]. In clinical consultations, not everything is or can
be taken into account; there is limited time [62], our
brains do not process everything [35], we are forgetful and
the ‘whole’ story is not told to us. Reduction is an essential
and ever-present process to create knowledge and experi-
ence reality. As Heisenberg wrote ‘what we observe is not
nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of ques-
tioning’ [63]. Arguably, what we observe as clinicians is
not reality itself but the reality exposed to our method of
reducing or filtering the various potentially relevant
streams of knowledge of which we are consciously or un-
consciously aware and from those, constructing a picture
of current reality.
As we explore a clinical case by questioning, examining
and testing, some things get more ‘certain’, but the overall
picture will not necessarily become clearer. For example,
in the case of abdominal pain, a stool sample makes us
more certain about the organisms involved. However, it
says little about the social context in which a particular
type of pain occurs and recurs. If we ask a patient about
her daily life, we may build a fuller, clearer and more holis-
tic understanding of the abdominal pain—and the stool
sample may become less of a priority. Indeed, an inciden-
tal growth of a pathogen in the stool sample may confuse
and distract us if the ‘real’ cause of the abdominal pain is
migraine, marital stress or the side effects of medication.
Reducing in the spirit of mindlines is a creative process,
not a reductionist one, like carving a particular ‘abdominal
pain’ out of a piece of buzzing, blooming reality [64] with
an infinite number of dimensions.
How the ‘truth’ is arrived at
Gabbay and le May offer many detailed examples of how
clinicians co-construct knowledge and discuss several
theories that help to understand these processes such as
the knowledge creation cycle developed by Nonaka and
Takeuchi explaining the growth of tacit knowledge in or-
ganisations [12]. But unlike the papers we found that
simply see mindlines as heuristics, Gabbay and le May
explain that logical thinking is embedded in mindlines.
What we derive from this is that the set of tools used to
reduce or construct (depending on our perception of
realities) the knowledge base for a clinical decision dif-
fers dramatically between conventional EBM and mind-
lines. In the former, the dominant tool for identifying
knowledge is rational, conscious questioning, and the
main requirement of that knowledge is validity—that is,
if it fulfils the criteria of correspondence (to the real
world—for example, through a robust sampling proced-
ure), coherence (with what we define as a logical system
of high-quality knowledge—for example, derived from awell-conducted randomised trial and meeting the standards
of statistical prediction) and consensus (experts agree—for
example, through peer review). The literature on mindlines,
as reflected for instance in the circular evidence model sug-
gested by Walach et al. [36], fundamentally challenges these
philosophical criteria by which a finding will become classi-
fied as ‘true’ as they are inadequate to make predictions in
the real world of clinical practice.
In particular, EBM intentionally focuses on so-called
‘frequentist’ reasoning, in its quest to discard mechanism-
based reasoning and reliance on (potentially unreliable)
clinical expertise [65,66]. This type of reasoning is an eva-
sion of the fundamental inability to predict the future—or
more precisely the problem of induction [67]. If we look at
an association between A (such as a taking a tablet) and B
(such as a clinical outcome) in the rich context of everyday
practice, we may discover a web of interacting influences
linking A with B. Evidence-based reasoning is essentially a
process of stripping the causal net (compare Pearl [68])
from the association between A and B (‘bias’), in order to
find a single general yet virtual rule—and then applying
this rule to predict the future in another situation where A
and B, but also the bias, are present. This might be termed
reality-to-rule-to-reality reasoning. In contrast, mindlines
allow other evasions of the induction problem (such as
Bayesian learning from a one-off experience [67]) in a
chain of reasoning that might be termed reality-to-
pattern-to-reality, which allows practitioners to keep the
network of causality intact from one case to the next.
As articulated in the idea of systems 1 and 2 know-
ledge [35], mindlines draw more on tacit knowledge, the
knowledge we subconsciously use when focusing on the
things we want to do [69]. Subconsciously knowing how
to interpret gestures, smell, interaction, environment
and time during a consultation reduces prevailing uncer-
tainties and helps us to further shape our holistic under-
standing and make predictions of what is likely to
happen in this case.
More importantly, mindlines encapsulate a more sophis-
ticated and comprehensive concept of truth than trad-
itional EBM. As Gabbay and le May eloquently explain
[12], mindlines take a constructivist approach to know-
ledge, assuming that it is created in social processes,
through discourse, influenced by cultural and historic
forces. This chimes with the work of the Russian
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, who proposed that a unified
truth involves sharing personal knowledge with others
who provide a separate perspective. ‘The idea lives not in
one person’s isolated individual consciousness—if it re-
mains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins
to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew
its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when
it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other
ideas, with the ideas of others’ [70]. Similarly, the Austrian
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soning that all knowledge is collective [71].
Aligning with this focus on the intersubjective nature
of knowledge creation [72,73], we contend that contrary
to the fears expressed by Glasziou in the quote above,
mindlines are not void of validation processes in spite of
being mainly tacit. They convey strong and rich ele-
ments of shared sense-making (and hence consensus-
making), both conscious and unconscious; they address
correspondence with reality as it pushes back in the local
context; and they address coherence using other types of
evasions of the induction problem. In sum, mindlines
can be accurate and useful in a local setting and provide
useful predictions, despite not being construed accord-
ing the set of reduction tools and beliefs underpinning
the EBM paradigm.Economics, politics and ethics
The political, economic and ethical dimensions of the
processes of knowledge creation in the papers in our
sample were almost never directly linked to mindlines.
This is surprising, given that mindlines and traditional
EBM differ considerably in this perspective. Several papers
in our sample noted that politicians, research leaders,
management consultant firms, lobbying groups, the
pharmaceutical industry and many other powerful actors
use their influence to define research priorities, what
counts as medical evidence, how knowledge is distributed
and how resources are allocated [31,39,74-76]. In EBM,
population-derived statistical estimates fit the needs of
policymakers as they provide truths that are—apparently
—‘right’ for groups and those who interact with those
groups, such as governments and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. What is viewed as good care for a defined group as
a whole is in some way regarded as good for individuals.
Mindlines however lack this overarching ‘built-in’ criterion
of what is right or wrong patient care. With other authors,
Gabbay and le May worry that mindlines can spread ‘col-
lective folly’ [12].
EBM strongly adheres to the ‘deficit model’ [77], which
entails that clinicians and patients are regarded as de-
ficient in certain knowledge: evidence-based know-
ledge. This is considered a moral problem of ‘leaving
people incapable of understanding the world around
them’ [78]. Mindlines, on the other hand, correspond
more with the idea that anyone, including patients,
create valid knowledge too and can be ‘experts’ in con-
sultations [79]. With the current evolution towards
person-based medicine and practices [80], the deficit
model may be set to give way to a more pluralist and
constructivist one. But at the same time, this may un-
comfortably question our basic assumptions about
who decides what is good or bad care.Knowledge management, knowledge intermediation
Although Gabbay and le May aptly remark ‘how ironically
inconsistent it would be if [they would] try to dictate how
[their] work should be put in practice’ [12], many of the im-
plications they discuss have been explored in the literature
we found. We discovered articles that explored which
sources of knowledge clinicians actually use, projects that
aimed to bring research and practice closer together and
the development of organisational structures such as com-
munities of practice and virtual social networks to support
the use of ‘knowledge-in-practice-in-context’. But what
strikes us when considering these implications for practice
is the question of whether controlling knowledge creation
is actually feasible. EBM assumes that knowledge can be
managed, and that, through intermediation, the knowledge
deficit of both practitioners and patients can be rectified.
In contrast, mindlines remind us by their emphasis on
tacit knowledge that knowledge creation is in large part
unmanageable. A one-off event experienced by an indi-
vidual is all too real for them, ‘anecdotal’ though it may
be to others. Furthermore, we cannot control all interac-
tions nor can we control all aspects of resources and
contexts. Knowledge development is an organic rather
than rational process, which can only be controlled to a
limited extent. Currie et al. note that the implication of
mindlines is that ‘any attempt at managing professiona-
lised and tacit knowledge in health care through the mobil-
isation of explicit and codified knowledge faces significant
challenge’ [81]. As Contandriopoulos et al. conclude in
their review on the dissemination of knowledge: ‘…the
quest for context-independent evidence on the efficacy of
knowledge exchange strategies is probably doomed’ [39].
This picture of knowledge as fluid, multiple, uncontainable
and defying rationality is a long way from the hopes and
dreams of the EBM movement [6] or even science itself.
Thomas Kuhn touches the core of the matter writing: ‘We
are all deeply accustomed to seeing science as the one en-
terprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by
nature in advance. But need there be any such goal?’ [48].
However, it would be wrong to conclude that because
mindlines are constructed, tacit, emergent and shared,
they are directionless. On the contrary, there is evidence
that the knowledge of mindlines is ‘self-organising’,
tending to achieve stability over time. Broekaert noticed
‘real human commitment consists of an open, method-
ical, meaningful search for the best solution for a certain
problem’ [82]. Consciously and subconsciously, we col-
lectively create and continuously refine more or less en-
during frameworks to look at the world, based on our
previous experiences, opinions of colleagues and experts,
practical knowledge, guidelines and articles, produced in
discourse, agreement and consensus with others, limited
by psychological abilities, contexts and the physical
world. The more closely the statement, ‘This patient
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even if she doesn't take antibiotics today’ persists in such
a framework, the more real, useful and valid it becomes.
Persistence is not without risk. In evidence-based
guideline development and research, we are used to syn-
thesising a single version of reality to settle differences
[83] and provide consistency of care. But ‘consistency’ of
care can harm as well as help individual patients since
such an approach may limited our list of differential
diagnoses to common or obvious options, removing the
possibility of managing the unusual case differently [84].
Similarly, we have to prevent our mindlines from be-
coming too rigid. Unanimity, or the absence of logical
contradiction, prevents the development of new, com-
peting theories and innovations, which needed from
time to time to replace the current paradigms [48].
This raises the question of why persistence of know-
ledge in the form of mindlines is valuable if knowledge
is inherently ephemeral and too much persistence risks
making our decisions too rigid. Ernst Mach argued: ‘If
our dreams were more regular, more connected, more
stable, they would also have more practical importance
for us’ [85]. Haridimos Tsoukas contends that ‘[U]nder-
standing presupposes an Archimedes’ point, a perspective
(undoubtedly an irremediably open-ended and evolving
perspective, but a perspective nonetheless) from which the
world may be viewed, accounted for, and interpreted.
Ironically, abundantly available information leads to
formlessness and, thus, to a diminished capacity for un-
derstanding. ’ [86]. Persistence keeps a perspective open
for exploration, prediction and guidance of human be-
haviour. We need persistence to help us to see and find
new events, insights and practices so we limit discon-
tinuity or instability that nobody agrees with. Most of in-
finite reality is not created, distributed, translated or
mediated. We miss things because we have to in order
to experience anything at all.
Hasok Chang [87] argues that scientific realism should
commit to pursue many theories to find where reality
‘resists’, whilst investing to preserve theories that did not
seem to work that well. In the future, those might turn
out to give helpful alternative insights. Applied to mind-
lines, this may translate to a call to create a broad menu
of mindlines to find where collective reality ‘resists’
using many methods of truth finding. If we want to
intermediate the process of knowledge creation (to the
limited extent that this is possible), further research
needs to look into how to speed up the cycle of building
and turning over many more persistent mindlines, whilst
keeping alternative, less persistent ones afloat efficiently.
In sum, mindlines offers a philosophically and theoretic-
ally sophisticated perspective on knowledge and clinical
method. Yet in 10 years since the concept was introduced,
the study of mindlines has remained a minority sportwithin critical social science whilst research within the
EBM movement on the generation, circulation and use of
evidence has remained predominantly (though by no
means exclusively) wedded to a naïve rationalist view of
knowledge.
The strength of this review is its tight focus on the
word ‘mindlines’ and Gabbay and le May’s original 2004
paper in the literature to address the question of how
the word and their work have been used, and the meta-
narrative approach which allowed us to consider differ-
ent philosophical assumptions behind different uses of
the word. The limitation is that the concept of mindlines
may have been discussed more extensively in grey litera-
ture, institutional reports and other forums, which we
would not have detected using our search.
We hope this review will encourage practitioners and
policymakers, along with academics, to embrace fully the
implications of the mindlines paradigm. In our sample,
Malterud noticed that the EBM movement does not limit
the best evidence to randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
and meta-analysis, ‘Yet, the foundation for integrating the
available sources of knowledge remains unclear. We still do
not know whether convincing information leads to optimal
decision making’ [88]. Similarly, Jonas argues that ‘we need
to broaden and deepen our understanding of what counts
as “evidence” and which types of evidence are best used to
inform differing aspects of clinical decision making’ [89]. A
new research agenda is needed, which should centre first
and foremost on the processes and interactions by which
mindlines are validated by both clinicians and patients. Re-
search should also seek to break down the walls between
EBM and mindlines, for example, by exploring how mind-
lines emerge and are negotiated in guideline development
groups and research communities. Through such interdis-
ciplinary work, it should be possible to identify ways to
broaden the methods that such groups could use to create
richer and more valid forms of ‘evidence-based’ knowledge.
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